 1/draftietflampspkixshake03.txt 20181125 21:13:10.384388920 0800
+++ 2/draftietflampspkixshake04.txt 20181125 21:13:10.416389687 0800
@@ 1,46 +1,47 @@
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
InternetDraft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang
Expires: April 22, 2019 NIST
 October 19, 2018
+Expires: May 29, 2019 NIST
+ November 25, 2018
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
 Identifiers for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs as Hash Functions
 draftietflampspkixshake03
+ Identifiers for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
+ draftietflampspkixshake04
Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
 conventions for using the SHAKE family of hash functions in the
 Internet X.509 as oneway hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic
 Signature Scheme and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for
 the associated subject public keys are also described.
+ conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509
+ certificates and CRLs as oneway hash functions with the RSA
+ Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The
+ conventions for the associated subject public keys are also
+ described.
Status of This Memo
This InternetDraft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
InternetDrafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as InternetDrafts. The list of current Internet
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
InternetDrafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use InternetDrafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 This InternetDraft will expire on April 22, 2019.
+ This InternetDraft will expire on May 29, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/licenseinfo) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
@@ 57,32 +58,44 @@
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1.1. RSASSAPSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. RSASSAPSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+ Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+ Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
+ o draftietflampspkixshake04:
+
+ * Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
+ Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979bis.
+
+ * Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
+ randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.
+
+ * Various ASN.1 fixes.
+
+ * Text fixes.
+
o draftietflampspkixshake03:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Added ASN.1.
o draftietflampspkixshake02:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.
@@ 112,52 +125,53 @@
* Added Public key algorithm OIDs.
* Populated Introduction and IANA sections.
o draftietflampspkixshake00:
* Initial version
2. Introduction
 This document describes several cryptographic algorithm identifiers
 for several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output
+ This document describes cryptographic algorithm identifiers for
+ several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output
SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the
Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
 The SHA3 family of oneway hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
 In the SHA3 family, two extendableoutput functions (SHAKEs):
+ In the SHA3 family, two extendableoutput functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3224, SHA3256, SHA3384, and SHA3512 are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSAPSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the
 mask generating function in RSASSAPSS. In Section 4, we define four
 new OIDs for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA when SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
 used. The same algorithm identifiers are used for identifying a
 public key, and identifying a signature.
+ mask generating function in RSASSAPSS. This specification describes
+ the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in X.509 and their meaning.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
4. Identifiers
+ This section defines four new OIDs for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA when
+ SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are used. The same algorithm identifiers are
+ used for identifying a public key in RSASSAPSS.
+
The new identifiers for RSASSAPSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below.
@@ 167,29 +181,29 @@
csor(3) algorithms(4) idecdsawithshake(3)
TBD }
idecdsawithshake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { jointisoccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) idecdsawithshake(3)
TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
 The parameters for these four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
+ The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSAPSS and ECDSA. In
summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
 SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions, their output lengths
 are (n  264) or (n  520) bits respectively, where n is a RSA
+ SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSAPSS, their output
+ length is (n  264) or (n  520) bits respectively, where n is a RSA
modulus size in bits.
5. Use in PKIX
5.1. Signatures
Signatures can be placed in a number of different ASN.1 structures.
The top level structure for an X.509 certificate, to illustrate how
signatures are frequently encoded with an algorithm identifier and a
location for the signature, is
@@ 198,105 +212,88 @@
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in
X.509 [RFC5280].
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
 by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSAPSS and
 ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Encoding rules
 for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055]
 and [RFC5480] respectively.

 Conforming client implementations that process RSASSAPSS and ECDSA
 with SHAKE signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST
 recognize the corresponding OIDs.
+ by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSAPSS or
+ ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
+ client implementations that process RSASSAPSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
+ signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
+ corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA
+ signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480]
+ respectively.
5.1.1. RSASSAPSS Signatures
The RSASSAPSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When idRSASSA
PSSSHAKE128 or idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, idRSASSA
PSSSHAKE128 or idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
 algorithm as the mask generation function "MGF(H, emLen  hLen  1)"
 [RFC8017] used in RSASSAPSS MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256
 respectively. The outputlength of the hash algorithm which hashes
 the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.

 In RSASSAPSS, a mask generation function takes an octet string of
 variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an
 octet string of the desired length. In RSASSAPSS with SHAKES, the
 SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1
 algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as
 specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is
 defined as

 SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen)

 and

 SHAKE256(mgfSeed, maskLen)
+ algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSAPSS MUST be
+ the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The outputlength of
+ the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
+ respectively.
 respectively for idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128 and idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256.
 The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet
 string. The maskLen for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the MGF
 is (n  264)/8 or (n  520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA
 modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output
 length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 223 or 191 when id
 RSASSAPSSSHAKE128 or idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256 is used respectively.
+ The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
+ and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
+ the desired length. In RSASSAPSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be
+ used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
+ uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
+ Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
+ the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for idRSASSAPSS
+ SHAKE128 and idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
+ seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. The
+ output length is (n  264)/8 or (n  520)/8 bytes respectively, where
+ n is the RSA modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is
+ 2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be
+ 223 or 191bits when idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128 or idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256
+ is used respectively.
The RSASSAPSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the idecdsawithSHAKE128 or idecdsawithSHAKE256
(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id
ecdsawithSHAKE128 or idecdsawithSHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
 the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
 The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
+ the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
+ The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively.
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures in certificates or CRLs MUST generate such signatures with
a deterministicly generated, nonrandom k in accordance with all the
requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
these standards. These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively are
subtitutions for 256 and 512bit output hash algorithms such as
SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
 In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of [RFC6979], HMAC is used to derive
 the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate
 deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with
 SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in [SP800185] when
 SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm,
 respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with
 SHAKE256 have 256bit and 512bit outputs respectively, and the
 optional customization bit string S is an empty string.

5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm
through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID
and optionally associated parameters.
In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:
@@ 308,25 +305,27 @@
The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:
o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
public key.
o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The
algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key
as an exact multiple of 8bits.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
 by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSAPSS and
 ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. The
 conventions for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
 identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,
 but we include them below for convenience.
+ by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSAPSS or
+ ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
+ client implementations that process RSASSAPSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
+ public key when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
+ corresponding OIDs. The conventions for RSASSAPSS and ECDSA public
+ keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055]
+ and [RFC5480] , but we include them below for convenience.
5.2.1. RSASSAPSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSAPSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers
@@ 348,73 +347,65 @@
For ECDSA, the public key identifier defined in [RFC5480] is
idecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) ansiX962(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience:
 The idecPublicKey parameters MUST be present and are defined as
+ The idecPublicKey parameters MUST be absent or present and are
+ defined as
ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
 implicitCurve NULL
 specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
}
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
6. IANA Considerations
[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
 functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
 will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
 unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
 excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.The
 shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
 input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
 truncating a 512bit output of SHA512 by taking its 256 leftmost
 bits. These 256 leftmost bits are a prefix of the 512bit output.
+ function, executing multiple times with the same input will produce
+ the same output. Therefore, users should not expect unrelated
+ outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from running a
+ SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. The shorter of
+ any two outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same input is a prefix
+ of the longer one. It is a similar situation as truncating a 512bit
+ output of SHA512 by taking its 256 leftmost bits. These 256 left
+ most bits are a prefix of the 512bit output.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
 the signer's private key permits masquerade.

 Implementations must randomly generate onetime values, such as the k
 value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation
 of public/private key pairs relies on random numbers. The use of
 inadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to generate such
 cryptographic values can result in little or no security. The
 generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086] offers
 important guidance in this area, and [SP80090A] series provide
 acceptable PRNGs.
+ the signer's private key permits masquerade attacks.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
implementations.
8. Acknowledgements
 We would like to thank Sean Turner and Jim Schaad for his valuable
+ We would like to thank Sean Turner and Jim Schaad for their valuable
contributions to this document.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
@@ 430,108 +421,97 @@
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
.
+ [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
+ Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
+ Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
+ 2013, .
+
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA3
Standard  PermutationBased Hash and ExtendableOutput
Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, .
 [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
 "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
 DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
 .

 [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
 Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
 Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
 2013, .

[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
.
 [SP800185]
 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA3
 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
 ParallelHash. NIST SP 800185", December 2016,
 .

 [SP80090A]
 National Institute of Standards and Technology,
 "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
 Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 80090A",
 June 2015,
 .

[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.622005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 module
 This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in X.509. This
+ This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509. This
module does not come from any existing RFC.
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE2018 { iso(1) identifiedorganization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) idmod(0)
idmodpkix1shake2018(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN
 EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
 FROM [RFC5912]
 PUBLICKEY, SIGNATUREALGORITHM, DIGESTALGORITHM, MACALGORITHM,
 SMIMECAPS
+ PUBLICKEY, SIGNATUREALGORITHM, DIGESTALGORITHM, SMIMECAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation2009
{ iso(1) identifiedorganization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) idmod(0)
idmodalgorithmInformation02(58) }
 FROM [RFC5912]
 idRSASSAPSS, RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, idecPublicKey,
+ RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, idecPublicKey,
ECPoint, ECDSASigValue
FROM PKIXAlgs2009 { iso(1) identifiedorganization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) idmod(0)
idmodpkix1algorithms200802(56) }

+  Message Digest Algorithms (mda)
+ 
+ HashAlgs DIGESTALGORITHM ::= {
+ ...
+  This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5912]
+ mdashake128 
+ mdashake256,
+ ...
+ }
+
+ 
 OneWay Hash Functions
 SHAKE128
mdashake128 DIGESTALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER idshake128  with output length 32 bytes.
}
idshake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
@@ 541,29 +522,27 @@
}
idshake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 }

 Public Key (pk) Algorithms

PublicKeys PUBLICKEY ::= {
 ...,
+ ...
pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE128 
 pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE256 
 pkec,
+ pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE256,
...
}
 From [RFC5912]  Here so it compiles.

pkrsa PUBLICKEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
 Private key format not in this module 
CERTKEYUSAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
}
 The hashAlgorithm is mdashake128
@@ 560,36 +539,36 @@
pkrsa PUBLICKEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
 Private key format not in this module 
CERTKEYUSAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
}
 The hashAlgorithm is mdashake128
  The maskGenAlgorithm is mdashake128
+  The maskGenAlgorithm is idshake128
 Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
 (n  264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
 the saltLength is 32
 the trailerField is 1
pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE128 PUBLICKEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
 Private key format not in this module 
CERTKEYUSAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
 The hashAlgorithm is mdashake256
  The maskGenAlgorithm is mdashake256
+  The maskGenAlgorithm is idshake256
 Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
 (n  520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
 the saltLength is 64
 the trailerField is 1
pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE256 PUBLICKEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
 Private key format not in this module 
CERTKEYUSAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
@@ 612,95 +591,90 @@
 specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
 Details for specifiedCurve can be found in [X9.62]
 Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
 with ANSI X.9.
}

 Signature Algorithms (sa)

SignatureAlgs SIGNATUREALGORITHM ::= {
 ...,
+ ...
 This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912]
sarsassapssWithSHAKE128 
 sarsassapssWithSHAKE256 
+ sarsassapssWithSHAKE256,
+ ...
saecdsaWithSHAKE128 
 saecdsaWithSHAKE256
+ saecdsaWithSHAKE256,
+ ...
}

 SMIME Capabilities (sa)

SMimeCaps SMIMECAPS ::= {
 ...,
+ ...
 The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5912]
sarsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps 
 sarsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps 
+ sarsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
saecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps 
 saecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps
+ saecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
+ ...
}
 RSASSAPSS with SHAKE128
sarsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATUREALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
 The hashAlgorithm is mdashake128
  The maskGenAlgorithm is mdashake128
+  The maskGenAlgorithm is idshake128
 Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
 (n  264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
 the saltLength is 32
 the trailerField is 1
 HASHES {mdashake128}  omitting mdashake128params
+ HASHES mdashake128
PUBLICKEYS { pkrsa  pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE128 }
SMIMECAPS { IDENTIFIED BY idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128 }
}
idRSASSAPSSSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
 RSASSAPSS with SHAKE256
sarsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATUREALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
 The hashAlgorithm is mdashake256
  The maskGenAlgorithm is mdashake256
+  The maskGenAlgorithm is idshake256
 Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
 (n  520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
 the saltLength is 64
 the trailerField is 1
 HASHES {mdashake256}  omitting mdashake256params
+ HASHES mdashake256
PUBLICKEYS { pkrsa  pkrsaSSAPSSSHAKE256 }
SMIMECAPS { IDENTIFIED BY idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256 }
}
idRSASSAPSSSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
 Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE128
  Generating k by using KMAC with SHAKE128 as the hash
  [SP800185] instead of HMAC with output length 256bits
  that is equal to or slightly less than the elliptic
  curve group order. S is set to an empty string.
saecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATUREALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER idecdsawithshake128
VALUE ECDSASigValue
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
HASHES { mdashake128 }
PUBLICKEYS { pkec }
SMIMECAPS { IDENTIFIED BY idecdsawithshake128 }
}
idecdsawithshake128 ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
 Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE256
  Generating k by using KMAC with SHAKE256 as the hash
  [SP800185] instead of HMAC with output length 512bits
  truncated to equal to or slightly less than the elliptic
  curve group order. S is set to an empty string.
saecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATUREALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER idecdsawithshake256
VALUE ECDSASigValue
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
HASHES { mdashake256 }
PUBLICKEYS { pkec }
SMIMECAPS { IDENTIFIED BY idecdsawithshake256 }
}
idecdsawithshake256 ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)